Archives: December 2008

Beyond politics

In the introduction to his collection of writings, Socratic Puzzles, Robert Nozick writes that  he never responded to the sizable literature on Anarchy, State and Utopia. His natural inclination would be to defend his views. As Nozick notes, “How could I learn that my views were mistaken if I thought about them always with defensive juices flowing.” Nozick’s confession raises a more general question for an individual as he thinks about society and his place in it. How can one pursue reason and virtue when “defensive juices” are continuously being triggered by politics and ideology?

The prospect of a de-politicized society seems remote. When individuals frame their interests as a function of collective choice, perpetual strife and division is born with it. The habit to look at society as a set of problems to be solved (whether through “piecemeal engineering” and tinkering or fanatical pursuit of grandiose ideas) instead of seeing it as “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (as John Rawls phrased it), cultivates and reinforces the political consequentialism that permeates contemporary opinion.  Far from being the defining element of modern liberalism, this teleological perspective on society unites most modern political thinking as expressed in appeals to “Fairness,” “Growth,” “Freedom” as values that should guide public policy.

It seems counterintuitive for (classical) liberal thought not to propose the pursuit of liberty as a goal for society. But as Anthony de Jasay points out in Before Resorting to Politics,

The question of whether freedom is valuable or a free society is good ought not to enter at all into a properly thought-out political doctrine, liberal or other. It should be resolutely ignored. Whichever way the question were answered would, it seems to me, inevitably steer us in a teleological direction, and undermine the foundations on which the society that we could consider free might stand and survive.

In his book Natural Rights and History, the philosopher Leo Strauss identified Thomas Hobbes as a thinker within the Epicurean tradition that perceived man as an a-political animal. But according to Strauss, Hobbes

…gives that a-political view a political meaning. He tries to instill the spirit of political idealism into the hedonistic tradition. He thus became the creator of political hedonism, a doctrine which has revolutionized human life everywhere on a scale never yet approached by any other teaching.

But instead of following Strauss in his rejection of Hobbes’ mechanistic worldview, we only reject his “political hedonism” and restore Hobbes to its a-political Epicurean tradition by rejecting his identification of individual choice with collective choice.

The German philosopher of science Regard Radnitzky notes that “there is a striking analogy between (a) the dilemma of contractarianism in political philosophy and (b) the “justificationist” dilemma in German epistemology.” Whereas the traditional Hobbesian argument for the state does not come off the ground because of the lack of an enforcer to enforce the contract to create Leviathan, the quest for certainty leads to descriptive statements without ground or an infinite regress of arguments. If rational choice does not require political choice and the search for objective values to inform public policy will be recognized as an occult endeavor, the Aristotelian image of man as a political animal will collapse and Epicurean withdrawal from politics may take its place.

At the 2005 Austrian Scholars Conference, Martin Masse spoke favorably of Epicurus as a forerunner of libertarian philosophy:

Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, were all statists to various degrees, glorified political involvement, and devised political programs for their audiences of rich and well-connected aristocrats. Epicurus focused on the individual search for happiness, counseled not to get involved in politics because of the personal trouble it brings, and thought that politics was irrelevant….He had no political program to offer and one can find no concept of collective virtues or order or justice in his teachings….

The Epicurean wise man will keep the covenant and not harm others not because he wishes to comply with some moral injunction being imposed from above, but simply because that’s the best way to pursue his happiness and keep his tranquility of mind.

Epicurus believed that tranquility of mind could not be found in political involvement, that we can choose life without fearing death, and rejected superstition in favor of empiricism. His contractarian theory of justice anticipated a philosophical tradition that looks for the source of morals in agreement (”neither to harm nor be harmed”), but that treats politics with skepticism.

The 20th century witnessed a progressive decomposition of liberal thought and the celebration of a politicized society. No person, or according to some people, no atom, should be exempt from the special plans that are being made for this world. Although the 2008 financial meltdown could have given pause to those that see society as a means to an end, the emerging wisdom is that the current problems were caused by a lack of control instead of a lack of restraint.

During the final years of his life the reactionary thinker Julius Evola had to face the question of how a  radical traditionalist was to act in a world that had evolved into the opposite of what he stood for. Evola recommended a detached life, or as the wisdom goes, “to be in the world, but not of it.” He advocated  apolitea, the withdrawal from contemporary politics and abandonment of political activism.  Instead of fighting the current age he recommended to “ride the tiger” until the tiger is exhausted.  One does not have to follow Evola in his obscurantist philosophies to appreciate this perspective.

This is part 3 in a 3 part series on voting, elections and politics.

Part 1: The calculus of voting
Part 2: The addiction to politics

The addiction to politics

Can politics become an addiction? A more realistic question is to ask why politics is an addiction for so many people. The most straightforward answer would be that a compulsive interest in politics just reflects a natural preoccupation with advancing one’s interest (or that of others). But as was discussed in the previous installment, The Calculus of Voting, as general rule, politics is not a very effective means to advance one’s interests. Could it be that the identification of advancing one’s interests and engagement with politics reflects tribal instincts? As Hal Finney writes on the blog Overcoming Bias:

We have this instinct that choosing our Leader is as important to our lives as it was when we were a tribe of two dozen, and that we have similar influence over the result. Following elections and participating in politics activates these vestigial tribal instincts in much the same was as sports, with similarly futile results.

Such an explanation helps in reconciling the mysterious discrepancy between the empowerment voters  experience when engaging in politics and the actual power it confers to them. If during most of mankind’s existence there was a strong relationship between participation in small-scale decision making and individual consequences, it should not be surprising that we have evolved to be “political animals” and that such instincts are even triggered in elections where millions of people vote and where most individual goals can be more easily gained by non-political individual acts.

It is interesting to note that the changed scale in human interaction does not produce similar effects in markets. Being a consumer of a product or service does not become more futile when more people consume  the good. A company can grow to serve millions of individuals in different nations and supply and demand generally ensures that one gets what one chooses. In his book Social Contract, Free Ride:A Study of the Public Goods Problem, Anthony de Jasay even argues that the absolute size of a group is not directly relevant to the rationality of voluntary contribution to public goods.

Although much ink has been spilled over political bias in the media, one rarely encounters the opinion that the media devotes too much attention to politics as such. Most people who shape public opinion and write for a living seem to share the Aristotelian vision of political participation as salvation. As William C. Mitchell and Randy T. Simmons write in their book Beyond Politics:

Participating in the political process is seen as a way of lifting oneself above the crass self-interest many believe characterize market transactions. In this essentially Aristotelian vision people are not able to reach their highest potential unless they participate in the political process. In fact, such participation is deemed necessary for human moral development.

But as public choice scholars have pointed out, the nature of man does not change as soon as he enters the political arena or takes office. Perhaps it even brings out his worst traits or selects for the people that have them. The short-term and divisive nature of everyday politics seems to be a very fertile ground for fanaticism and biased reasoning.

The desire to engage in political battle and to see one party as the enemy is so strong that, as Bryan Caplan speculates, people tend to ignore the absence of any real differences in public policy between the major parties for the  sake  of enjoying the illusion of a partisan rift:

So what is the “key difference” between the parties? Rhetoric. When Republicans advocate a small contraction of the welfare state, Democrats claim that Republicans totally oppose the welfare state. And many Republicans oblige them by standing up for “liberty” and “responsibility.” Similarly, when Democrats advocate a small expansion in the welfare state, Republican claim that Democrats oppose free markets. And many Democrats oblige them by saying things like “markets only benefit the rich.”

This rhetorical illusion is so powerful that when a Democrat like Clinton adopts many pro-market reforms, Republicans still hate him as a 60s radical. And when Bush II sharply expands the welfare state, Democrats still hate him as a billionaire’s lackey.

The observation that people can get so excited  about rhetoric despite minor differences in public policy does not bode well for the view of politics as salvation or as a source for wisdom or personal growth.

Although one would expect the views and temperament of people who advocate a de-politicized society to steer them away from a strong engagement with practical politics, a surprising number seem obsessed with everything political. It appears that the tribal instinct to engage in politics and strife does not necessarily exclude people who claim that society would be better off without it.

Some of the most remarkable examples of such libertarian obsession with electoral politics were displayed during the Ron Paul campaign. For example, self-identified libertarian anarchists were observed to continuously monitor the primary elections results and blog the latest results online. But when Ron Paul failed to win the primaries, many of his advocates returned to advocating non-voting instead.

Although campaigning to vote for a  politician on one occasion and advocating non-voting on another may reflect just pragmatic political strategy, such a mixed message risks leaving people profoundly confused. In some respects it is also incoherent. The orthodox economic argument that in large democracies  an individual vote has a very low probability of deciding the outcome does not change when Ron Paul runs for office.

But perhaps the most persuasive argument against resorting to politics is one of opportunity costs. All the time that has been spent in vain to political campaigning and producing handbooks to persuade politicians to  refrain from being politicians could have been spent on the creation of private alternatives for government, education of the general public, and legal assistance to people who are faced with government interference instead. One does not have to subscribe to the view that voting is an immoral act to agree that “if one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself.”

Further reading: Carl Watner (ed.) & Wendy McElroy (ed.): Dissenting Electorate: Those Who Refuse to Vote and the Legitimacy of Their Opposition

This is part 2 in a 3 part series on voting, elections and politics.

Part 1: The calculus of voting
Part 3: Beyond politics

The calculus of voting

Is it rational to vote? For most people the question may seem absurd but quite a few economists and political scientists have made the claim that it is not. The reasoning is that in large elections the probability that your individual vote will decide the outcome is so small that voting is a futile exercise. A classic statement of the orthodox economic view of voting can be found in David Friedman’s Price Theory: An Intermediate Text:

“…consider someone making two decisions–what car to buy and what politician to vote for. In either case, the person can improve his decision (make it more likely that he acts in his own interest) by investing time and effort in studying the alternatives. In the case of the car, his decision determines with certainty which car he gets. In the case of the politician, his decision (whom to vote for) changes by one ten-millionth the probability that the candidate he votes for will win. If the candidate would be elected without his vote, he is wasting his time; if the candidate would lose even with his vote, he is also wasting his time.”

If the probability of affecting the outcome is negligible, there is no strong incentive to inform oneself of the  positions of the candidates. Contrary to respectable opinion, being ignorant about politics  can be rational. This  stands in stark contrast to the situation of a consumer in the marketplace who is going to get what  he chooses. Leaving aside the complicating issue of “public goods,” it might be argued that there is no tension between rationality and choice in the marketplace but there is a serious tension between rationality and participation in (large scale) democratic elections.

Strictly speaking, the negligible probability that one’s vote will decide the outcome of an election itself does not render voting irrational. A voter may place an extremely high value on a particular outcome of  the election. So even if the probability of deciding the outcome is very low,  a voter may still be motivated to vote. To use an interesting example, if one believes that the probability of resuscitation of cryonics patients is very low, one can still justify the decision to make cryonics arrangements because of the high value placed on being alive. But a contrary position is possible as well. If one does not care about the outcome of an election, the low probability of affecting that outcome will even further undermine the reason to go out and vote.

In his 1971 book for new voters, Why Vote?, the author William C. Mitchell is making this very point.  He believes that people who do not care about the value of the outcome in an election where the probability of influencing it is perceived to be very low is a good reason to abstain from voting. In all other scenarios, he recommends voting.  He also mentions another reason to vote; voting may be intrinsically rewarding and can be seen as an expression of values, such as the support for democracy. But in 1994, the same William C. Mitchell co-authored a book with Randy T. Simmons called Beyond Politics: Markets, Welfare, and the Failure of Bureaucracy, an introduction to public choice (the economic study of politics) that displays a far more negative vision on government and politics as evidenced by sections such as “In Dispraise of Politics—Some Public Choices,” “The Anatomy of Public Failure,” “In Praise of Property, Profits, and Markets.” The authors revisit the issue of voting as follows:

Voting is a painfully limited way to express one’s values and preferences. It accomplishes its results only indirectly; the vote does not immediately call forth that which is voted for. In fact, if we vote for something but are in the minority we do not get it at all, if we vote against something and are in the minority, we get it and are compelled to pay for the unwanted goods or services.

The authors also address the issue that as more voters participate in an election the individual power of  a vote decreases. In light of this, it is hard to make something of campaigns to “get out the vote” that appeal to the power conferred by  voting. The more people are persuaded by such a message, the less their votes matter.  Perhaps the value of a vote would increase if voters would be able to sell it. But there is a great taboo on  selling votes. But this taboo may not be consistent if one considers the fact it only applies to one part of the electoral process. Politicians routinely “buy” votes by promising entitlements to specific groups.

The value one assigns to different election outcomes is informed by one’s views on the relationship between a specific candidate winning and the effects on policy. For example, if one believes that in terms of public policy (not just rhetoric), there is not enough difference between the parties, the value one attaches to a specific outcome will lessen. If one further believes that contemporary democratic politics will generate an endless cycle between slightly different policies (for example, mixed economies with a bias on markets versus mixed economies with a bias on government), and substantial deviations from this generate their own incentive for  substantial reversals, the combination of a low chance of affecting the outcome and a decreased interest in a specific outcome of the election, will tip the scales in favor of abstaining from voting again.

The only argument that does not appear to be so vulnerable to considerations about the expected benefits from voting is that which claims that by voting one is expressing support for political democracy and ensures a non-violent transition of power. But there is an important flip-side to this argument because it can also explain why people may decide not to vote. By not voting people can “signal” to others their disapproval of a system that allows one person (or group) to gain at the expense of another. Historically such a perspective has been rare because of the conviction that the existence of government is necessary to solve public goods and coordination problems. But economic and political arguments for the necessity of government have been subjected to increased (technical) scrutiny by  some economists and political philosophers, culminating in a school of thought that seeks to substitute markets and private institutions for government.

It may be true that voting is not just about self-interest but about expressing oneself, but so is not voting.

Further reading: Doug Casey – None of the Above

This is part I in a 3 part series on voting, elections and politics.

Part 2: The addiction to politics
Part 3: Beyond politics

L.A. Rollins’ case against natural rights

Nine-Banded Books has done the world a great favor in publishing a new edition of L.A. Rollins’ The Myth of Natural Rights. Although one could argue that in one sense it is a mixed blessing because it indicates that there is still a need for such a book. While the idea of natural rights seems to be in decline in contemporary libertarian  philosophy, mainstream political culture is more infected with “rights-talk” than ever. In ordinary discourse the word “right” has become a substitute for “whatever I want for myself” or “whatever I want for others,” and if such demands are heeded, just another term to characterize the outcome of political power. But why not  just call a spade a spade and, for example, just demand that the rich hand over their money to the poor? Perhaps this would not be as effective; whereas power is associated with irrationality and aggression, rights convey the image of reason and peace. But what if all this talk about natural (or human) rights is “nonsense on stilts.” That is where L.A. Rollins’ book comes into play.

Although Rollins’ book can be read as a general argument against natural rights, he is mainly concerned with Objectivist and libertarian authors such as Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard. Broadly speaking, Rollins presses the argument that the case for existence of natural rights is neither empirical nor logical.

As of writing, Arthur Guyton’s Textbook of Medical Physiology is now in its 11th edition with more than 1100 pages, but so far no evidence for the existence of natural rights has been found in humans. So perhaps the case for natural rights needs to be found in man’s capacity for reason, or his “need” to use reason without coercion. But as Rollins argues, from a need to be free from coercion does not  logically follow a natural right to be free from coercion, let alone an argument for others to refrain from coercion.  Not only that, Rollins recognizes the flexibility in arguments from “need.” It should not be surprising then, that arguments derived from “needs” have been used to claim rights to virtually everything under the sun, from access to health care to a 36 hour work week.

According to Murray Rothbard natural rights “are embedded in a greater structure of “natural law.” But what is the status of such “law?” How does it differ from laws that are discovered by science?  Scientific laws,  such as the laws of physics, cannot be altered by human action. They describe how things are. Natural law does not describe how things are but how things should be. But what “nature” requires or dictates is in the eye of the beholder. Almost any conceivable form of morality (or public policy) has been defended by appeals to natural law. Adolf Hitler is reported to have said:

“The Earth continues to go around, whether it’s the man who kills the tiger or the tiger who eats the man. The stronger asserts his will, it’s the law of nature. The world doesn’t change; its laws are eternal.”

In the case of Ayn Rand, Rollins highlights a number of flaws in her derivation of rights such as the futile attempt to derive an ought from an is (which is a persistent error in natural rights thinking), the problem of using different meanings of the same word (such as “right”), and the unintended implications of her reasoning. For example, Rollins argues that Rand’s derivation of rights from the requirement of survival would not only give rights to humans but to animals as well, something that she would not likely approve of.

Murray Rothbard does not fair better in Rollins’ book. Although Ludwig von Mises is generally perceived to be a utilitarian of sorts, most contemporary Austrian economists reject utilitarianism as either methodologically confused or collectivist in nature (or both). As a consequence, Rothbard felt pressed to look for the source of libertarian rights in natural law and logic. Although these writings have been illuminating in some respects, the whole approach of deriving rights from man’s nature has been less than persuasive as can be seen in Rollins’ treatment of Rothbard’s argument. More recent attempts to derive self-ownership and private property from the requirements of argumentation (Hans-Hermann Hoppe) have met with great skepticism as well.

Perhaps the Austrian economists are on the wrong track in assuming the burden of proof for liberty and property. As Austrians like Rothbard and Walter Block have not failed to point out, one major problem in social contract defenses of the state is that hypothetical agreement is treated as actual agreement. So why do these Austrians not stick to a strict interpretation of contractarianism as an alternative? One argument could be that the custom of contract requires a “moral” framework to function. But this can be questioned. As argued by Anthony de Jasay in Social Contract, Free Ride, most contracts are self-enforcing (or have a  high probability to be self-enforcing) because they are mutually advantageous. And for contracts that are at risk of defection (for example, contracts where there is a time difference for the parties to deliver), private enforcement and/or mechanisms of social exclusion in case of defection will be an option.

So where exactly does this urge to find an ultimate moral justification for libertarian rights come from? As the political philosopher Anthony de Jasay often argues in his writings, such attempts at justification confuse the difference between a liberty and a right and (unintentionally) encourages a way of thinking (and political climate) in which one has to demonstrate a “right” to do something to lift it out of the universe of prohibitions. Instead, de Jasay argues that logic and epistemology dictate that liberty should be presumed and that that the burden of proof is on those that advocate interference with a liberty.

This does not mean that there is no role for moral or political philosophy at all. If anything, the most credible moral and political philosophy, and of which Rollin’s book is a good example, have been  exercises in demonstrating that most justifications for moral and political obligation are flawed. As TGGP points out in his excellent introduction, if there is any prospect for a positive theory of morality it  may be found in authors that subscribe to some form of moral contractarianism such as advocated by the late Benjamin Tucker or David Gauthier. Academic philosophers may argue that such an approach to morals is too minimal, “incomplete,” and at best could “only” justify (or perhaps we should say, explain) conventions (not necessarily laws)  against killing, stealing or cheating. But is is hard to see why this should be a concern to libertarians! As a matter of fact, one libertarian philosopher, Jan Narveson, has exactly drawn such conclusions. Such a position would not constitute a “justification” of libertarianism; libertarianism either follows from practical reason or it does not.

In his 2008 afterword to The Myth of Natural Rights Rollins asks “why does everyone have to play the moral game?” striking at the heart of not only natural rights philosophy but moral philosophy itself. A similar point has been raised by David Gauthier when he characterized the tendency of philosophers to assume that people need to justify their actions to others in a moral framework as “the secularized residue of the doctrine that persons seek to justify their actions before God. But once that residue is being recognized for what it is, it surely loses all credibility.” If there is a persuasive reason why amoral egoists would benefit from playing “the moral game” it may be found in Gauthier’s work (or others who work in this tradition). Barring the success of such efforts, Rollins’ book is a fatal blow to libertarian philosophy.

The new edition of The Myth of Natural Rights also includes an updated version of Lucifer’s Lexicon, styled after Ambrose Bierce’s The Devil’s Dictionary, but with great emphasize on ridiculing self-styled libertarians (of all sorts) and, in its updated version, the doublespeak in contemporary political discourse. Some examples:

Agnostic,n. A Godfearing atheist.

Budget Cut,n. Formerly, a decrease in government spending. Now, a decrease in the rate of increase in government spending.

Social Security, n. Subsidized senility.

And there is a  definition of a certain Ayn Rand novel that is too naughty to publish here.

L.A. Rollins is drawn towards controversial topics as evidenced by his writings on holocaust revisionism and his “Open Letter to Allah,” which begins with, “Dear Allah, I’ve been reading your book, The Holy Qur’an. What a crock of sh#t!” As it turns out, Allah knows less about the solar system than we would expect considering his wisdom.

The Myth of Natural Rights is not just obligatory reading for libertarians with philosophical tendencies, but for anyone who believes in “rights,” from “liberal” activists to members of human rights organizations.  “Rights-talk” has been a major obstacle in clear thinking about human interaction and an inexhaustible source for imposing obligation without agreement and entitlement without a title.

Let’s hope Nine-Banded Books keeps delivering the goods.

The political philosophy of bailout

All politics is redistributive. Although this is often hidden from view through appeals to the social contract, democracy, and the common good, the recent attempts to reward unsound business practices with taxpayers’ money make even the most sophisticated appeal to the “common good” look suspicious. Although advocates of liberty have offered persuasive accounts about the involvement of  the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve Bank leading up to the current “crisis,” the root problem is the teleological mindset that sees the market and government as instruments to achieve certain goals.

Looking at the (long term) consequences of an act is an important part of individual decision making.  This is so obvious that we are led to believe that such consequentialism is possible for society as a whole.  Political consequentialism can take two forms. In its first incarnation, it is assumed that society is a collective effort toward shared goals. This view regards society, and as a consequence “the economy,” as one organism. A good example of this mindset is displayed by Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell when he says, “Our whole economy you could think of as the human body and the credit markets as the circulatory system.” Presumably, any measures that are made to restore circulation will benefit us all.

Unfortunately, we see a similar outlook on society among advocates of liberty who talk about promoting “growth” or “efficiency.” Although their policy recommendations may be less intrusive, the assumption of shared goals is the same. Equally troubling is the acceptance of concepts like “market failure” and “government failure” as if these concepts are purely technical in nature, instead of implicit value judgments.

In its second incarnation, different interests and values among individuals are acknowledged but it is believed that policies can be designed to optimize a “social welfare function.” This position is a non-starter on epistemological grounds, as evidenced in real life by the lack of consensus among its advocates. This should not be surprising because consequentialism is not possible without guesswork and making personal value judgments. As the political philosopher Anthony de Jasay has argued, at some point someone needs to make decisions that will be binding for all, and consequentialism will ultimately collapse into authoritarianism, plain and simple. Nevertheless, this view has obvious appeal to people  who advocate government intervention and redistribution of incomes.

In times of crisis (imagined or real), the latter position is simply abandoned for the former, as documented by Robert Higgs in his book “Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government.”

The interventions that led to the current problems, and the proposals to solve them, suffer from the same  activist, fanatical, mindset that looks at society and its institutions as something that can be “improved” through collective choice.